connections with each other, as far as experience informs me of them.
This suffices for the conduct of life; and this also suffices for my
philosophy, which pretends only to explain the nature and causes of our
perceptions, or impressions and ideas [Footnote 4.].

[Footnote 4. As long as we confine our speculations to the appearances of
objects to our senses, without entering into disquisitions concerning
their real nature and operations, we are safe from all difficulties, and
can never be embarrassed by any question. Thus, if it be asked, if the
invisible and intangible distance, interposed betwixt two objects, be
something or nothing: It is easy to answer, that it is SOMETHING, VIZ. a
property of the objects, which affect the SENSES after such a particular
manner. If it be asked whether two objects, having such a distance betwixt
them, touch or not: it may be answered, that this depends upon the
definition of the word, TOUCH. If objects be said to touch, when there is
nothing SENSIBLE interposed betwixt them, these objects touch: it objects
be said to touch, when their IMAGES strike contiguous parts of the eye,
and when the hand FEELS both objects successively, without any interposed
motion, these objects do not touch. The appearances of objects to our
senses are all consistent; and no difficulties can ever arise, but from
the obscurity of the terms we make use of.

If we carry our enquiry beyond the appearances of objects to the senses,
I am afraid, that most of our conclusions will be full of scepticism and
uncertainty. Thus if it be asked, whether or not the invisible and
intangible distance be always full of body, or of something that by an
improvement of our organs might become visible or tangible, I must
acknowledge, that I find no very decisive arguments on either side; though
I am inclined to the contrary opinion, as being more suitable to vulgar
and popular notions. If THE NEWTONIAN philosophy be rightly understood,