understand perfectly all those particular ideas, which may enter into our
reasoning.

There is no impression nor idea of any kind, of which we have any
consciousness or memory, that is not conceived as existent; and it is
evident, that from this consciousness the most perfect idea and assurance
of being is derived. From hence we may form a dilemma, the most clear and
conclusive that can be imagined, viz. that since we never remember any
idea or impression without attributing existence to it, the idea of
existence must either be derived from a distinct impression, conjoined
with every perception or object of our thought, or must be the very same
with the idea of the perception or object.

As this dilemma is an evident consequence of the principle, that every
idea arises from a similar impression, so our decision betwixt the
propositions of the dilemma is no more doubtful. go far from there being
any distinct impression, attending every impression and every idea, that
I do not think there are any two distinct impressions, which are
inseparably conjoined. Though certain sensations may at one time be united,
we quickly find they admit of a separation, and may be presented apart.
And thus, though every impression and idea we remember be considered as
existent, the idea of existence is not derived from any particular
impression.

The idea of existence, then, is the very same with the idea of what we
conceive to be existent. To reflect on any thing simply, and to reflect
on it as existent, are nothing different from each other. That idea, when
conjoined with the idea of any object, makes no addition to it. Whatever
we conceive, we conceive to be existent. Any idea we please to form is
the idea of a being; and the idea of a being is any idea we please to