greater or lesser into my thoughts, when I look on any object. And these
I find to be, FIRST, the magnitude or extension of the visible object,
which being immediately perceived by sight, is connected with that other
which is tangible and placed at a distance. SECONDLY, the confusion or
distinctness. And thirdly, the vigorousness or faintness of the aforesaid
visible appearance. CETERIS PARIBUS, by how much the greater or lesser
the visible object is, by so much the greater or lesser do I conclude the
tangible object to be. But, be the idea immediately perceived by sight
never so large, yet if it be withal confused, I judge the magnitude of
the thing to be but small. If it be distinct and clear, I judge it
greater. And if it be faint, I apprehend it to be yet greater. What is
here meant by confusion and faintness hath been explained in sect. 35.

57. Moreover the judgments we make of greatness do, in like manner as
those of distance, depend on the disposition of the eye, also on the
figure, number, and situation of objects and other circumstances that
have been observed to attend great or small tangible magnitudes. Thus,
for instance, the very same quantity of visible extension, which in the
figure of a tower doth suggest the idea of great magnitude, shall in the
figure of a man suggest the idea of much smaller magnitude. That this is
owing to the experience we have had of the usual bigness of a tower and a
man no one, I suppose, need be told.

58. It is also evident that confusion or faintness have no more a
necessary connexion with little or great magnitude than they have with
little or great distance. As they suggest the latter, so they suggest the
former to our minds. And by consequence, if it were not for experience,
we should no more judge a faint or confused appearance to be connected
with great or little magnitude, than we should that it was connected with
great or little distance.