same to all. For suppose it otherwise, and that the MINIMUM VISIBILE of a
mite, for instance, be less than the MINIMUM VISIBILE of a man: the
latter therefore may by detraction of some part be made equal to the
former: it doth therefore consist of parts, which is inconsistent with
the notion of a MINIMUM VISIBILE or point.

81. It will perhaps be objected that the MINIMUM VISIBILE of a man doth
really and in itself contain parts whereby it surpasses that of a mite,
though they are not perceivable by the man. To which I answer, the
MINIMUM VISIBILE having (in like manner as all other the proper and
immediate objects of sight) been shown not to have any existence without
the mind of him who sees it, it follows there cannot be any pan of it
that is not actually perceived, and therefore visible. Now for any object
to contain distinct visible parts, and at the same time to be a MINIMUM
VISIBILE, is a manifest contradiction.

82. Of these visible points we see at all times an equal number. It is
every whit as great when our view is contracted and bounded by near
objects as when it is extended to larger and remoter. For it being
impossible that one MINIMUM VISIBILE should obscure or keep out of sight
mote than one other, it is a plain consequence that when my view is on
all sides bounded by the walls of my study see just as many visible
points as I could, in case that by the removal of the study-walls and all
other obstructions, I had a full prospect of the circumjacent fields,
mountains, sea, and open firmament: for so long as I am shut up within
the walls, by their interposition every point of the external objects is
covered from my view: but each point that is seen being able to cover or
exclude from sight one only other corresponding point, it follows that
whilst my sight is confined to those narrow walls I see as many points,
or MINIMA VISIBILIA, as I should were those walls away, by looking on all