119 In this affair we must carefully distinguish between ideas
of sight and touch
120 Difficult to explain by words the true Theory of Vision
121 The question, whether there is any IDEA common to sight
and touch, stated
122 Abstract extension inquired into
123 It is incomprehensible
124 Abstract extension not the OBJECT of geometry
125 The general IDEA of a triangle, considered
126 Vacuum, or pure space, not common to sight and touch
127 There is no idea, or kind of idea, common to both senses
128 First argument in proof hereof
129 Second argument
130 Visible figure and extension, not distinct IDEAS from colour
131 Third argument
132 Confirmation drawn from Mr. Molyneux's problem of a sphere
and a cube, published by Mr. Locke
133 Which is falsely solved, if the common supposition be true
134 More might be said in proof of our tenet, but this suffices
135 Further reflection on the foregoing problem
136 The same thing doth not affect both sight and touch
137 The same idea of motion not common to sight and touch
138 The way wherein we apprehend motion by sight, easily collected
from what hath been said
139 QU. How visible and tangible IDEAS came to have the same name
if not of the same kind
140 This accounted for without supposing them of the same kind
141 OBJ. That a tangible square is liker to a visible square than
to a visible circle
142 ANS. That a visible square is fitter than a visible circle,