not see two earths as A does: it sees only what is represented by the
little pictures in A, and consequently shall judge the man erect. For, in
truth, the man in B is not inverted, for there the feet are next the
earth; but it is the representation of it in A which is inverted, for
there the head of the representation of the picture of the man in B is
next the earth, and the feet farthest from the earth, meaning the earth
which is without the representation of the pictures in B. For if you take
the little images of the pictures in B, and consider them by themselves,
and with respect only to one another, they are all erect and in their
natural posture.

117. Farther, there lies a mistake in our imagining that the pictures of
external objects are painted on the bottom of the eye. It hath been shown
there is no resemblance BETWEEN the ideas of sight and things tangible.
It hath likewise been demonstrated that the proper objects of sight do
not exist without the mind. Whence it clearly follows that the pictures
painted on the bottom of the eye are not the pictures of external
objects. Let anyone consult his own thoughts, and then say what affinity,
what likeness there is between that certain variety and disposition of
colours which constitute the visible man, or picture of a man, and that
other combination of far different ideas, sensible by touch, which
compose the tangible man. But if this be the case, how come they to be
accounted pictures or images, since that supposes them to copy or
represent some originals or other?

118. To which I answer: in the forementioned instance the eye A takes the
little images, included within the representation of the other eye B, to
be pictures or copies, whereof the archetypes are not things existing
without, but the larger pictures projected on its own fund: and which by
A are not thought pictures, but the originals, or true things themselves.