127. It having been shown that there are no abstract ideas of figure, and
that it is impossible for us by any precision of thought to frame an idea
of extension separate from all other visible and tangible qualities which
shall be common both to sight and touch: the question now remaining is,
whether the particular extensions, figures, and motions perceived by
sight be of the same kind with the particular extensions, figures, and
motions perceived by touch? In answer to which I shall venture to lay
down the following proposition: THE EXTENSION, FIGURES, AND MOTIONS
PERCEIVED BY SIGHT ARE SPECIFICALLY DISTINCT FROM THE IDEAS OF TOUCH
CALLED BY THE SAME NAMES, NOR is THERE ANY SUCH THING as ONE IDEA OR KIND
OF IDEA COMMON TO BOTH SENSES. This proposition may without much
difficulty be collected from what hath been said in several places of
this essay. But because it seems so remote from, and contrary to, the
received notions and settled opinion of mankind, I shall attempt to
demonstrate it more particularly and at large by the following arguments.

128. When upon perception of an idea I range it under this or that sort,
it is because it is perceived after the same manner, or because it has a
likeness or conformity with, or affects me in the same way as, the ideas
of the sort I rank it under. In short, it must not be entirely new, but
have something in it old and already perceived by me. It must, I say,
have so much at least in common with the ideas I have before known and
named as to make me give it the same name with them. But it has been, if
I mistake not, clearly made out that a man born blind would not at first
reception of his sight think the things he saw were of the same nature
with the objects of touch, or had anything in common with them; but that
they were a new set of ideas, perceived in a new manner, and entirely
different from all he had ever perceived before: so that he would not
call them by the same name, nor repute them to be of the same sort with