144. But, nothing seems more to have contributed towards engaging men in
controversies and mistakes with regard to the nature and operations of
the mind, than the being used to speak of those things in terms borrowed
from sensible ideas. For example, the will is termed the motion of the
soul; this infuses a belief that the mind of man is as a ball in motion,
impelled and determined by the objects of sense, as necessarily as that
is by the stroke of a racket. Hence arise endless scruples and errors of
dangerous consequence in morality. All which, I doubt not, may be
cleared, and truth appear plain, uniform, and consistent, could but
philosophers be prevailed on to retire into themselves, and attentively
consider their own meaning.

145. KNOWLEDGE OF SPIRITS NOT IMMEDIATE.--From what has been said,
it is plain that we cannot know the existence of other spirits
otherwise than by their operations, or the ideas by them excited
in us. I perceive several motions, changes, and combinations of ideas,
that inform me there are certain particular agents, like myself,
which accompany them and concur in their production. Hence, the
knowledge I have of other spirits is not immediate, as is the
knowledge of my ideas; but depending on the intervention of ideas, by me
referred to agents or spirits distinct from myself, as effects or
concomitant signs.

146. But, though there be some things which convince us human agents are
concerned in producing them; yet it is evident to every one that those
things which are called the Works of Nature, that is, the far greater
part of the ideas or sensations perceived by us, are not produced by, or
dependent on, the wills of men. There is therefore some other Spirit that
causes them; since it is repugnant that they should subsist by