confession of the ablest patrons of abstract ideas, who acknowledge that
they are made in order to naming; from which it is a clear consequence
that if there had been no such things as speech or universal signs there
never had been any thought of abstraction. See III. vi. 39, and elsewhere
of the Essay on Human Understanding. Let us examine the manner wherein
words have contributed to the origin of that mistake.--First
[Vide sect. xix.] then, it is thought that every name has, or
ought to have, ONE ONLY precise and settled signification, which
inclines men to think there are certain ABSTRACT, DETERMINATE IDEAS
that constitute the true and only immediate signification of each
general name; and that it is by the mediation of these abstract
ideas that a general name comes to signify any particular thing.
Whereas, in truth, there is no such thing as one precise and definite
signification annexed to any general name, they all signifying
indifferently a great number of particular ideas. All which doth
evidently follow from what has been already said, and will clearly appear
to anyone by a little reflexion. To this it will be OBJECTED that every
name that has a definition is thereby restrained to one certain
signification. For example, a TRIANGLE is defined to be A PLAIN SURFACE
COMPREHENDED BY THREE RIGHT LINES, by which that name is limited to
denote one certain idea and no other. To which I answer, that in the
definition it is not said whether the surface be great or small, black or
white, nor whether the sides are long or short, equal or unequal, nor
with what angles they are inclined to each other; in all which there may
be great variety, and consequently there is NO ONE SETTLED IDEA which
limits the signification of the word TRIANGLE. It is one thing for to
keep a name constantly to the same definition, and another to make it
stand everywhere for the same idea; the one is necessary, the other
useless and impracticable.