[Note: "To make this appear with all the light and evidence of an axiom,
it seems sufficient if I can but awaken the reflection of the reader,
that he may take an impartial view of his own meaning, and in turn his
thoughts upon the subject itself, free and disengaged from all embarrass
of words and prepossession in favour of received mistakes."--Edit 1710]

7. SECOND ARGUMENT.[Note.]--From what has been said it follows there is
NOT ANY OTHER SUBSTANCE THAN SPIRIT, or that which perceives. But, for the
fuller proof of this point, let it be considered the sensible qualities
are colour, figure, motion, smell, taste, etc., i.e. the ideas perceived
by sense. Now, for an idea to exist in an unperceiving thing is a
manifest contradiction, for TO HAVE AN IDEA IS ALL ONE AS TO PERCEIVE;
that therefore wherein colour, figure, and the like qualities exist must
perceive them; hence it is clear there can be no UNTHINKING substance or
SUBSTRATUM of those ideas.

[Note: Vide sect. iii. and xxv.]

8. OBJECTION.--ANSWER.--But, say you, though the ideas themselves do not
exist without the mind, yet there may be things LIKE them, whereof they
are copies or resemblances, which things exist without the mind in an
unthinking substance. I ANSWER, an idea can be like nothing but an idea; a
colour or figure can be like nothing but another colour or figure. If we
look but never so little into our thoughts, we shall find it impossible
for us to conceive a likeness except only between our ideas. Again, I ask
whether those supposed originals or external things, of which our ideas
are the pictures or representations, be themselves perceivable or no? If
they are, THEN THEY ARE IDEAS and we have gained our point; but if you say
they are not, I appeal to any one whether it be sense to assert a colour
is like something which is invisible; hard or soft, like something which