each part of the mundane system, is as much a REAL BEING by our
principles as by any other. Whether others mean anything by the term
REALITY different from what I do, I entreat them to look into their own
thoughts and see.

37. THE PHILOSOPHIC, NOT THE VULGAR SUBSTANCE, TAKEN AWAY.--I will
be urged that thus much at least is true, to wit, that we take
away all corporeal substances. To this my answer is, that if the word
SUBSTANCE be taken in the vulgar sense--for a combination of sensible
qualities, such as extension, solidity, weight, and the like--this we
cannot be accused of taking away: but if it be taken in a philosophic
sense--for the SUPPORT of accidents or QUALITIES WITHOUT THE MIND--then
indeed I acknowledge that we take it away, if one may be said to take
away that which never had any existence, not even in the imagination.

38. But, say you, it sounds very harsh to say we eat and drink
ideas, and are clothed with ideas. I acknowledge it does so--the word
IDEA not being used in common discourse to signify the several
combinations of sensible qualities which are called THINGS; and it is
certain that any expression which varies from the familiar use of
language will seem harsh and ridiculous. But this doth not concern the
truth of the proposition, which in other words is no more than to say, we
are fed and clothed with those things which we perceive immediately by
our senses. The hardness or softness, the colour, taste, warmth, figure,
or suchlike qualities, which combined together constitute the several
sorts of victuals and apparel, have been shown to exist only in the mind
that perceives them; and this is all that is meant by calling them IDEAS;
which word if it was as ordinarily used as THING, would sound no harsher
nor more ridiculous than it. I am not for disputing about the propriety,
but the truth of the expression. If therefore you agree with me that we