philosophers describe Matter--yet, if any man shall leave out of
his idea of matter the positive ideas of extension, figure, solidity
and motion, and say that he means only by that word an inert,
senseless substance, that exists without the mind or unperceived,
which is the occasion of our ideas, or at the presence whereof God is
pleased to excite ideas in us: it doth not appear but that Matter taken
in this sense may possibly exist. In answer to which I say, first, that
it seems no less absurd to suppose a substance without accidents, than it
is to suppose accidents without a substance. But secondly, though we
should grant this unknown substance may possibly exist, yet where can it
be supposed to be? That it exists not in the mind is agreed; and that it
exists not in place is no less certain--since all place or extension
exists only in the mind, as has been already proved. It remains
therefore that it exists nowhere at all.

68. MATTER SUPPORTS NOTHING, AN ARGUMENT AGAINST ITS EXISTENCE.--Let us
examine a little the description that is here given us of
matter. It neither acts, nor perceives, nor is perceived; for this is all
that is meant by saying it is an inert, senseless, unknown substance;
which is a definition entirely made up of negatives, excepting only the
relative notion of its standing under or supporting. But then it must be
observed that it supports nothing at all, and how nearly this comes to
the description of a nonentity I desire may be considered. But, say you,
it is the unknown occasion, at the presence of which ideas are excited in
us by the will of God. Now, I would fain know how anything can be present
to us, which is neither perceivable by sense nor reflexion, nor capable
of producing any idea in our minds, nor is at all extended, nor has any
form, nor exists in any place. The words "to be present," when thus
applied, must needs be taken in some abstract and strange meaning, and
which I am not able to comprehend.