PHIL. Inform me, Hylas. Is a sweet taste a particular kind of pleasure
or pleasant sensation, or is it not?

HYL. It is.

PHIL. And is not bitterness some kind of uneasiness or pain?

HYL. I grant it.

PHIL. If therefore sugar and wormwood are unthinking corporeal
substances existing without the mind, how can sweetness and bitterness,
that is, Pleasure and pain, agree to them?

HYL. Hold, Philonous, I now see what it was delude time. You asked
whether heat and cold, sweetness at were not particular sorts of pleasure
and pain; to which simply, that they were. Whereas I should have thus
distinguished: those qualities, as perceived by us, are pleasures or pair
existing in the external objects. We must not therefore conclude
absolutely, that there is no heat in the fire, or sweetness in the sugar,
but only that heat or sweetness, as perceived by us, are not in the fire
or sugar. What say you to this?

PHIL. I say it is nothing to the purpose. Our discourse proceeded
altogether concerning sensible things, which you defined to be, THE
THINGS WE IMMEDIATELY PERCEIVE BY OUR SENSES. Whatever other qualities,
therefore, you speak of as distinct from these, I know nothing of them,
neither do they at all belong to the point in dispute. You may, indeed,
pretend to have discovered certain qualities which you do not perceive,
and assert those insensible qualities exist in fire and sugar. But what