Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous by George Berkeley
page 20 of 139 (14%)
page 20 of 139 (14%)
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mind the sensation of SOUND. For, striking on the drum of the ear, it
causeth a vibration, which by the auditory nerves being communicated to the brain, the soul is thereupon affected with the sensation called SOUND. PHIL. What! is sound then a sensation? HYL. I tell you, as perceived by us, it is a particular sensation in the mind. PHIL. And can any sensation exist without the mind? HYL. No, certainly. PHIL. How then can sound, being a sensation, exist in the air, if by the AIR you mean a senseless substance existing without the mind? HYL. You must distinguish, Philonous, between sound as it is perceived by us, and as it is in itself; or (which is the same thing) between the sound we immediately perceive, and that which exists without us. The former, indeed, is a particular kind of sensation, but the latter is merely a vibrative or undulatory motion the air. PHIL. I thought I had already obviated that distinction, by answer I gave when you were applying it in a like case before. But, to say no more of that, are you sure then that sound is really nothing but motion? HYL. I am. PHIL. Whatever therefore agrees to real sound, may with truth be |
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