PHIL. And have true and real colours inhering in them?

HYL. Each visible object hath that colour which we see in it.

PHIL. How! is there anything visible but what we perceive by sight?

HYL. There is not.

PHIL. And, do we perceive anything by sense which we do not perceive
immediately?

HYL. How often must I be obliged to repeat the same thing? I tell you,
we do not.

PHIL. Have patience, good Hylas; and tell me once more, whether there
is anything immediately perceived by the senses, except sensible
qualities. I know you asserted there was not; but I would now be
informed, whether you still persist in the same opinion.

HYL. I do.

PHIL. Pray, is your corporeal substance either a sensible quality, or
made up of sensible qualities?

HYL. What a question that is! who ever thought it was?

PHIL. My reason for asking was, because in saying, EACH VISIBLE OBJECT
HATH THAT COLOUR WHICH WE SEE IN IT, you make visible objects to be
corporeal substances; which implies either that corporeal substances are