PHIL. Pray, what were those?

HYL. You were represented, in last night's conversation, as one who
maintained the most extravagant opinion that ever entered into the mind
of man, to wit, that there is no such thing as MATERIAL SUBSTANCE in
the world.

PHIL. That there is no such thing as what PHILOSOPHERS CALL MATERIAL
SUBSTANCE, I am seriously persuaded: but, if I were made to see anything
absurd or sceptical in this, I should then have the same reason to
renounce this that I imagine I have now to reject the contrary opinion.

HYL. What I can anything be more fantastical, more repugnant to Common
Sense, or a more manifest piece of Scepticism, than to believe there is
no such thing as MATTER?

PHIL. Softly, good Hylas. What if it should prove that you, who hold
there is, are, by virtue of that opinion, a greater sceptic, and maintain
more paradoxes and repugnances to Common Sense, than I who believe no
such thing?

HYL. You may as soon persuade me, the part is greater than the whole,
as that, in order to avoid absurdity and Scepticism, I should ever be
obliged to give up my opinion in this point.

PHIL. Well then, are you content to admit that opinion for true, which
upon examination shall appear most agreeable to Common Sense, and remote
from Scepticism?