obliges us to hold the same with regard to ABSOLUTE EXTENSION, which is
something abstracted from GREAT and SMALL, from this or that
particular magnitude or figure. So likewise as to motion; SWIFT and
SLOW are altogether relative to the succession of ideas in our own
minds. But, it doth not follow, because those modifications of motion
exist not without the mind, that therefore absolute motion abstracted
from them doth not.

PHIL. Pray what is it that distinguishes one motion, or one part of
extension, from another? Is it not something sensible, as some degree of
swiftness or slowness, some certain magnitude or figure peculiar to each?

HYL. I think so.

PHIL. These qualities, therefore, stripped of all sensible properties,
are without all specific and numerical differences, as the schools call
them.

HYL. They are.

PHIL. That is to say, they are extension in general, and motion in
general.

HYL. Let it be so.

PHIL. But it is a universally received maxim that EVERYTHING WHICH
EXISTS IS PARTICULAR. How then can motion in general, or extension in
general, exist in any corporeal substance?

HYL. I will take time to solve your difficulty.