distinctly formed, and apprehended by the mind? Mathematicians treat of
quantity, without regarding what other sensible. qualities it is attended
with, as being altogether indifferent to their demonstrations. But, when
laying aside the words, they contemplate the bare ideas, I believe you
will find, they are not the pure abstracted ideas of extension.

HYL. But what say you to PURE INTELLECT? May not abstracted ideas be
framed by that faculty?

PHIL. Since I cannot frame abstract ideas at all, it is plain I cannot
frame them by the help of PURE INTELLECT; whatsoever faculty you
understand by those words. Besides, not to inquire into the nature of
pure intellect and its spiritual objects, as VIRTUE, REASON, GOD,
or the like, thus much seems manifest--that sensible things are only to
be perceived by sense, or represented by the imagination. Figures,
therefore, and extension, being originally perceived by sense, do not
belong to pure intellect: but, for your farther satisfaction, try if you
can frame the idea of any figure, abstracted from all particularities of
size, or even from other sensible qualities.

HYL. Let me think a little--I do not find that I can.

PHIL. And can you think it possible that should really exist in nature
which implies a repugnancy in its conception?

HYL. By no means.

PHIL. Since therefore it is impossible even for the mind to disunite
the ideas of extension and motion from all other sensible qualities, doth
it not follow, that where the one exist there necessarily the other exist