HYL. I tell you, extension is only a mode, and Matter is something that
supports modes. And is it not evident the thing supported is different
from the thing supporting?

PHIL. So that something distinct from, and exclusive of, extension is
supposed to be the SUBSTRATUM of extension?

HYL. Just so.

PHIL. Answer me, Hylas. Can a thing be spread without extension? or is
not the idea of extension necessarily included in SPREADING?

HYL. It is.

PHIL. Whatsoever therefore you suppose spread under anything must have
in itself an extension distinct from the extension of that thing under
which it is spread?

HYL. It must.

PHIL. Consequently, every corporeal substance, being the SUBSTRATUM
of extension, must have in itself another extension, by which it is
qualified to be a SUBSTRATUM: and so on to infinity. And I ask whether
this be not absurd in itself, and repugnant to what you granted just now,
to wit, that the SUBSTRATUM was something distinct from and exclusive
of extension?

HYL. Aye but, Philonous, you take me wrong. I do not mean that Matter
is SPREAD in a gross literal sense under extension. The word
SUBSTRATUM is used only to express in general the same thing with