PHIL. And would not a man who had never known anything of Julius Caesar
see as much?

HYL. He would.

PHIL. Consequently he hath his sight, and the use of it, in as perfect
a degree as you?

HYL. I agree with you.

PHIL. Whence comes it then that your thoughts are directed to the Roman
emperor, and his are not? This cannot proceed from the sensations or
ideas of sense by you then perceived; since you acknowledge you have no
advantage over him in that respect. It should seem therefore to proceed
from reason and memory: should it not?

HYL. It should.

PHIL. Consequently, it will not follow from that instance that anything
is perceived by sense which is not, immediately perceived. Though I grant
we may, in one acceptation, be said to perceive sensible things mediately
by sense: that is, when, from a frequently perceived connexion, the
immediate perception of ideas by one sense SUGGESTS to the mind others,
perhaps belonging to another sense, which are wont to be connected with
them. For instance, when I hear a coach drive along the streets,
immediately I perceive only the sound; but, from the experience I have
had that such a sound is connected with a coach, I am said to hear the
coach. It is nevertheless evident that, in truth and strictness, nothing
can be HEARD BUT SOUND; and the coach is not then properly perceived by
sense, but suggested from experience. So likewise when we are said to see