HYL. I grant it.

PHIL. Sensible things therefore are nothing else but so many
sensible qualities, or combinations of sensible qualities?

HYL. Nothing else.

PHIL. HEAT then is a sensible thing?

HYL. Certainly.

PHIL. Doth the REALITY of sensible things consist in being perceived?
or, is it something distinct from their being perceived, and that bears
no relation to the mind?

HYL. To EXIST is one thing, and to be PERCEIVED is another.

PHIL. I speak with regard to sensible things only. And of these I ask,
whether by their real existence you mean a subsistence exterior to the
mind, and distinct from their being perceived?

HYL. I mean a real absolute being, distinct from, and without any
relation to, their being perceived.

PHIL. Heat therefore, if it be allowed a real being, must exist without
the mind?

HYL. It must.