diplomatic nothing spun and unravelled, but the result was both to
abandon the provinces and to offend Philip.

In the first answer given by her commissioners to the states' envoys, it
was declared, "that her Majesty considered it too expensive to assume the
protection of both provinces." She was willing to protect them in name,
but she should confer the advantage exclusively on Walcheren in reality.
The defence of Holland must be maintained at the expense of the Prince
and the estates.

This was certainly not munificent, and the envoys insisted upon more
ample and liberal terms. The Queen declined, however, committing herself
beyond this niggardly and inadmissible offer. The states were not
willing to exchange the sovereignty over their country for so paltry
a concession. The Queen declared herself indisposed to go further,
at least before consulting parliament. The commissioners waited for
the assembling of parliament. She then refused to lay the matter before
that body, and forbade the Hollanders taking any steps for that purpose.
It was evident that she was disposed to trifle with the provinces, and
had no idea of encountering the open hostility of Philip. The envoys
accordingly begged for their passports. These were granted in April,
1576, with the assurance on the part of her Majesty that "she would think
more of the offer made to her after she had done all in her power to
bring about an arrangement between the provinces and Philip."

After the result of the negotiations of Breda, it is difficult to imagine
what method she was likely to devise for accomplishing such a purpose.
The King was not more disposed than during the preceding summer to grant
liberty of religion, nor were the Hollanders more ready than they had
been before to renounce either their faith or their fatherland. The