contributions, imposts, and similar matters."

Thus much, and more of similar argument, logically urged, made it
sufficiently evident that twenty years of revolt and of hard fighting
against one king, had not destroyed in the minds of the leading
Netherlanders their conviction of the necessity of kingship. If the new
commonwealth was likely to remain a republic, it was, at that moment at
any rate, because they could not find a king. Certainly they did their
best to annex themselves to England, and to become loyal subjects of
England's Elizabeth. But the Queen, besides other objections to the
course proposed by the Provinces, thought that she could do a better
thing in the way of mortgages. In this, perhaps, there was something of
the penny-wise policy, which sprang from one great defect in her
character. At any rate much mischief was done by the mercantile spirit
which dictated the hard chaffering on both sides the Channel at this
important juncture; for during this tedious flint-paring, Antwerp, which
might have been saved, was falling into the hands of Philip. It should
never be forgotten, however, that the Queen had no standing army, and but
a small revenue. The men to be sent from England to the Netherland wars
were first to be levied wherever it was possible to find them. In truth,
many were pressed in the various wards of London, furnished with red
coats and matchlocks at the expense of the citizens, and so despatched,
helter-skelter, in small squads as opportunity offered. General Sir John
Norris was already superintending these operations, by command of the
Queen, before the present formal negotiation with the States had begun.

Subsequently to the 11th July, on which day the second address had been
made to Elizabeth, the envoys had many conferences with Leicester,
Burghley, Walsingham, and other councillors, without making much
progress. There was perpetual wrangling about figures and securities.