There could be no reasonable doubt that the designs of Spain against
England were hostile, and against Holland revengeful. It was at least
possible that Philip meant to undertake the conquest of England, and to
undertake it as a stepping-stone to the conquest of Holland. Both the
kingdom and the republic should have been alert, armed, full of suspicion
towards the common foe, full of confidence in each other. What decisive
blows might have been struck against Parma in the Netherlands, when his
troops were starving, sickly, and mutinous, if the Hollanders and
Englishmen had been united under one chieftain, and thoroughly convinced
of the impossibility of peace! Could the English and Dutch statesmen of
that day have read all the secrets of their great enemy's heart, as it is
our privilege at this hour to do, they would have known that in sudden
and deadly strokes lay their best chance of salvation. But, without that
advantage, there were men whose sagacity told them that it was the hour
for deeds and not for dreams. For to Leicester and Walsingham, as well
as to Paul Buys and Barneveld, peace with Spain seemed an idle vision.
It was unfortunate that they were overruled by Queen Elizabeth and
Burghley, who still clung to that delusion; it was still more disastrous
that the intrigues of Leicester had done so much to paralyze the
republic; it was almost fatal that his departure, without laying down his
authority, had given the signal for civil war.

During the winter, spring, and summer of 1588, while the Duke--in the
face of mighty obstacles--was slowly proceeding with his preparations in
Flanders, to co-operate with the armaments from Spain, it would have been
possible by a combined movement to destroy his whole plan, to liberate
all the Netherlands, and to avert, by one great effort, the ruin
impending over England. Instead of such vigorous action, it was thought
wiser to send commissioners, to make protocols, to ask for armistices,
to give profusely to the enemy that which he was most in need of--time.