expressed his hope that Parma would be punctual to the rendezvous.
Alexander immediately combated these views in letters to Medina and to
the King. He avowed that he would not depart one tittle from the plan
originally laid down. The 6000 men, and more if possible, were to be
furnished him, and the Spanish Armada was to protect his own flotilla,
and to keep the channel clear of enemies. No other scheme was possible,
he said, for it was clear that his collection of small flat-bottomed
river-boats and hoys could not even make the passage, except in smooth
weather. They could not contend with a storm, much less with the enemy's
ships, which would destroy them utterly in case of a meeting, without his
being able to avail himself of his soldiers--who would be so closely
packed as to be hardly moveable--or of any human help. The preposterous
notion that he should come out with his flotilla to make a junction with
Medina off Calais, was over and over again denounced by Alexander with
vehemence and bitterness, and most boding expressions were used by him as
to the probable result, were such a delusion persisted in.

Every possible precaution therefore but one had been taken. The King of
France--almost at the same instant in which Guise had been receiving his
latest instructions from the Escorial for dethroning and destroying that
monarch--had been assured by Philip of his inalienable affection; had
been informed of the object of this great naval expedition--which was not
by any means, as Mendoza had stated to Henry, an enterprise against
France or England, but only a determined attempt to clear the sea, once
for all, of these English pirates who had done so much damage for years
past on the high seas--and had been requested, in case any Spanish ship
should be driven by stress of weather into French ports, to afford them
that comfort and protection to which the vessels of so close and friendly
an ally were entitled.