French intention of proposing a league against the common enemy of both
nations, and that it would be unquestionably for the advantage of both
to unite their forces for a vigorous attack upon Spain, in which case it
would be more difficult for the Spanish to resist them than if each were
acting separately. It was no secret that the Spaniards would rather
attack England than France, because their war against England, being
coloured by a religious motive, would be much less odious, and would even
have a specious pretext. Moreover the conquest of England would give
them an excellent vantage ground to recover what they had lost in the
Netherlands. If, on the contrary, the enemy should throw himself with
his whole force upon France, the king, who would perhaps lose many places
at once, and might hardly be able to maintain himself single-handed
against domestic treason and a concentrated effort on the part of Spain,
would probably find it necessary to make a peace with that power.
Nothing could be more desirable for Spain than such a result, for she
would then be free to attack England and Holland, undisturbed by any fear
of France. This was a piece of advice, the duke said, which the king
offered, in the most friendly spirit, and as a proof of his affection,
to her Majesty's earnest consideration.

Burghley replied that all this seemed to him no reason for making a
league. "What more can the queen do," he observed, "than she is already
doing? She has invaded Spain by land and sea, she has sent troops to
Spain, France, and the Netherlands; she has lent the king fifteen hundred
thousand crowns in gold. In short, the envoys ought rather to be
studying how to repay her Majesty for her former benefits than to be
soliciting fresh assistance." He added that the king was so much
stronger by the recent gain of Marseilles as to be easily able to bear
the loss of places of far less importance, while Ireland, on the
contrary, was a constant danger to the queen. The country was already