in the States' service, and furnished, or was bound to furnish, a certain
yearly sum for their support. But the expenses of the campaigning had
been rapidly increasing and the results as swiftly dwindling. The
Advocate now explained that, "without loss both of important places and
of reputation," the States could not help spending every month that they
took the field 200,000 florins over and above the regular contributions,
and some months a great deal more. This sum, he said, in nine months,
would more than eat up the whole subsidy of the King. If they were to be
in the field by March or beginning of April, they would require from him
an extraordinary sum of 200,000 crowns, and as much more in June or July.

Eighteen months later, when the magnificent naval victory of Heemskerk
in the Bay of Gibraltar had just made a startling interlude to the
languishing negotiations for peace, the Advocate again warned the French
King of the difficulty in which the Republic still laboured of carrying
on the mighty struggle alone. Spain was the common enemy of all. No
peace or hope was possible for the leading powers as long as Spain was
perpetually encamped in the very heart of Western Europe. The
Netherlands were not fighting their own battle merely, but that of
freedom and independence against the all-encroaching world-power. And
their means to carry on the conflict were dwindling, while at the same
time there was a favourable opportunity for cropping some fruit from
their previous labours and sacrifices.

"We are led to doubt," he wrote once more to the envoy in France,
"whether the King's full powers will come from Spain. This defeat is
hard for the Spaniards to digest. Meantime our burdens are quite above
our capacity, as you will understand by the enclosed statement, which is
made out with much exactness to show what is absolutely necessary for a
vigorous defence on land and a respectable position at sea to keep things