of knighthood and a sermon on predestination were all he could bestow
upon the high commissioners in place of the alliance which he eluded,
and the military assistance which he point-blank refused. The possessory
princes, in whose cause the sword was drawn, were too quarrelsome and too
fainthearted to serve for much else than an incumbrance either in the
cabinet or the field.

And the States-General were equal to the immense responsibility.
Steadily, promptly, and sagaciously they confronted the wrath, the
policy, and the power of the Empire, of Spain, and of the Pope. Had the
Republic not existed, nothing could have prevented that debateable and
most important territory from becoming provinces of Spain, whose power
thus dilated to gigantic proportions in the very face of England would
have been more menacing than in the days of the Armada. Had the Republic
faltered, she would have soon ceased to exist. But the Republic did not
falter.

On the 13th July, Prince Maurice took command of the States' forces,
13,000 foot and 3000 horse, with thirty pieces of cannon, assembled at
Schenkenschans. The July English and French regiments in the regular
service of the United Provinces were included in these armies, but there
were no additions to them: "The States did seven times as much,"
Barneveld justly averred, "as they had stipulated to do." Maurice,
moving with the precision and promptness which always marked his military
operations, marched straight upon Julich, and laid siege to that
important fortress. The Archdukes at Brussels, determined to keep out
of the fray as long as possible, offered no opposition to the passage of
his supplies up the Rhine, which might have been seriously impeded by
them at Rheinberg. The details of the siege, as of all the Prince's
sieges, possess no more interest to the general reader than the working