as to the object of that suit, while they are also entitled to very
high respect and consideration in all parallel cases by all other
departments of the Government. And while it is obviously possible that
such decision may be erroneous in any given case, still the evil effect
following it, being limited to that particular case, with the chance
that it may be overruled and never become a precedent for other cases,
can better be borne than could the evils of a different practice. At
the same time, the candid citizen must confess that if the policy of
the Government upon vital questions affecting the whole people is to be
irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant they
are made in ordinary litigation between parties in personal actions the
people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that extent
practically resigned their Government into the hands of that eminent
tribunal. Nor is there in this view any assault upon the court or the
judges. It is a duty from which they may not shrink to decide cases
properly brought before them, and it is no fault of theirs if others
seek to turn their decisions to political purposes.

One section of our country believes slavery is right and ought to be
extended, while the other believes it is wrong and ought not to be
extended. This is the only substantial dispute. The fugitive-slave
clause of the Constitution and the law for the suppression of the
foreign slave trade are each as well enforced, perhaps, as any law can
ever be in a community where the moral sense of the people imperfectly
supports the law itself. The great body of the people abide by the dry
legal obligation in both cases, and a few break over in each. This, I
think, can not be perfectly cured, and it would be worse in both cases
after the separation of the sections than before. The foreign slave
trade, now imperfectly suppressed, would be ultimately revived without
restriction in one section, while fugitive slaves, now only partially