conditions. And I contended that to see this clearly is to see that
when we speak of movement being guided by feeling, we use the
language of a less advanced stage of enlightenment. This view has
since occupied a good deal of attention. Under the name of
automatism it has been advocated by Professor Huxley, and with
firmer logic by Professor Clifford. In the minds of our savage
ancestors feeling was the source of all movement . . . Using the
word feeling in its ordinary sense . . . WE ASSERT NOT ONLY THAT NO
EVIDENCE CAN BE GIVEN THAT FEELING EVER DOES GUIDE OR PROMPT ACTION,
BUT THAT THE PROCESS OF ITS DOING SO IS INCONCEIVABLE. (Italics
mine.) How can we picture to ourselves a state of consciousness
putting in motion any particle of matter, large or small? Puss,
while dozing before the fire, hears a light rustle in the corner,
and darts towards the spot. What has happened? Certain sound-waves
have reached the ear, a series of physical changes have taken place
within the organism, special groups of muscles have been called into
play, and the body of the cat has changed its position on the floor.
Is it asserted that this chain of physical changes is not at all
points complete and sufficient in itself?"

I have been led to turn to this article of Mr. Spalding's by Mr.
Stewart Duncan, who, in his "Conscious Matter," {142a} quotes the
latter part of the foregoing extract. Mr. Duncan goes on to quote
passages from Professor Tyndall's utterances of about the same date
which show that he too took much the same line--namely, that there
is no causative connection between mental and physical processes;
from this it is obvious he must have supposed that physical
processes would go on just as well if there were no accompaniment of
feeling and consciousness at all.