intelligent, and no intelligence, so different from our own as to
baffle our powers of comprehension deserves to be called
intelligence at all. The more a thing resembles ourselves, the more
it thinks as we do--and thus by implication tells us that we are
right, the more intelligent we think it; and the less it thinks as
we do, the greater fool it must be; if a substance does not succeed
in making it clear that it understands our business, we conclude
that it cannot have any business of its own, much less understand
it, or indeed understand anything at all. But letting this pass, so
far as we are concerned, [Greek text]; we are
body ensouled, and soul embodied, ourselves, nor is it possible for
us to think seriously of anything so unlike ourselves as to consist
either of soul without body, or body without soul. Unmattered
condition, therefore, is as inconceivable by us as unconditioned
matter; and we must hold that all body with which we can be
conceivably concerned is more or less ensouled, and all soul, in
like manner, more or less embodied. Strike either body or soul--
that is to say, effect either a physical or a mental change, and the
harmonics of the other sound. So long as body is minded in a
certain way--so long, that is to say, as it feels, knows, remembers,
concludes, and forecasts one set of things--it will be in one form;
if it assumes a new one, otherwise than by external violence, no
matter how slight the change may be, it is only through having
changed its mind, through having forgotten and died to some trains
of thought, and having been correspondingly born anew by the
adoption of new ones. What it will adopt depends upon which of the
various courses open to it it considers most to its advantage.

What it will think to its advantage depends mainly on the past
habits of its race. Its past and now invisible lives will influence