being situated on a straight line, if their apparent positions can be
made to coincide for observation with one eye, under suitable choice
of our place of observation.

If, in pursuance of our habit of thought, we now supplement the
propositions of Euclidean geometry by the single proposition that two
points on a practically rigid body always correspond to the same
distance (line-interval), independently of any changes in position to
which we may subject the body, the propositions of Euclidean geometry
then resolve themselves into propositions on the possible relative
position of practically rigid bodies.* Geometry which has been
supplemented in this way is then to be treated as a branch of physics.
We can now legitimately ask as to the "truth" of geometrical
propositions interpreted in this way, since we are justified in asking
whether these propositions are satisfied for those real things we have
associated with the geometrical ideas. In less exact terms we can
express this by saying that by the "truth" of a geometrical
proposition in this sense we understand its validity for a
construction with rule and compasses.

Of course the conviction of the "truth" of geometrical propositions in
this sense is founded exclusively on rather incomplete experience. For
the present we shall assume the "truth" of the geometrical
propositions, then at a later stage (in the general theory of
relativity) we shall see that this "truth" is limited, and we shall
consider the extent of its limitation.


Notes