the first one,--the mere feeling Q in the critic's mind for example.
Evading thus this objection, we turn to another which is sure to
be urged.

It will come from those philosophers to whom 'thought,' in the sense
of a knowledge of relations, is the all in all of mental life; and
who hold a merely feeling consciousness to be no better--one would
sometimes say from their utterances, a good deal worse--than no
consciousness at all. Such phrases as these, for example, are common
to-day in the mouths of those who claim to walk in the footprints
of Kant and Hegel rather than in the ancestral English paths: 'A
perception detached from all others, "left out of the heap we call a
mind," being out of all relation, has no qualities--is simply
nothing. We can no more consider it than we can see vacancy.' 'It is
simply in itself fleeting, momentary, unnameable (because while we
name it it has become another), and for the very same reason
unknowable, the very negation of knowability.' 'Exclude from what we
have considered real all qualities constituted by relation, we find
that none are left.'

Altho such citations as these from the writings of Professor Green
might be multiplied almost indefinitely, they would hardly repay
the pains of collection, so egregiously false is the doctrine they
teach. Our little supposed feeling, whatever it may be, from the
cognitive point of view, whether a bit of knowledge or a dream, is
certainly no psychical zero. It is a most positively and definitely
qualified inner fact, with a complexion all its own. Of course there
are many mental facts which it is NOT. It knows Q, if Q be a
reality, with a very minimum of knowledge. It neither dates nor
locates it. It neither classes nor names it. And it neither knows