for at all. Eggs resemble each other, but do not on that account
represent, stand for, or know each other. And if you say this
is because neither of them is a FEELING, then imagine the world to
consist of nothing but toothaches, which ARE feelings, feelings
resembling each other exactly,--would they know each other the
better for all that?

The case of q being a bare quality like that of toothache-pain is
quite different from that of its being a concrete individual thing.
There is practically no test for deciding whether the feeling of a
bare quality means to represent it or not. It can DO nothing to the
quality beyond resembling it, simply because an abstract quality is
a thing to which nothing can be done. Being without context or
environment or principium individuationis, a quiddity with
no haecceity, a platonic idea, even duplicate editions of such a
quality (were they possible), would be indiscernible, and no sign
could be given, no result altered, whether the feeling I meant to
stand for this edition or for that, or whether it simply resembled
the quality without meaning to stand for it at all.

If now we grant a genuine pluralism of editions to the quality q, by
assigning to each a CONTEXT which shall distinguish it from its
mates, we may proceed to explain which edition of it the feeling
knows, by extending our principle of resemblance to the context too,
and saying the feeling knows the particular q whose context it most
exactly duplicates. But here again the theoretic doubt recurs:
duplication and coincidence, are they knowledge? The gun shows which
q it points to and hits, by BREAKING it. Until the feeling can show
us which q it points to and knows, by some equally flagrant token,
why are we not free to deny that it either points to or knows any