the former. At the time I could not refute this transcendentalist
opinion. Later, largely through the influence of Professor D. S.
Miller (see his essay 'The meaning of truth and error,' in the
Philosophical Review for 1893, vol. 2 p. 403) I came to see that any
definitely experienceable workings would serve as
intermediaries quite as well as the absolute mind's
intentions would.]] All feeling is for the sake of action, all
feeling results in action,--to-day no argument is needed to prove
these truths. But by a most singular disposition of nature which we
may conceive to have been different, MY FEELINGS ACT UPON THE
REALITIES WITHIN MY CRITIC'S WORLD. Unless, then, my critic can
prove that my feeling does not 'point to' those realities which it
acts upon, how can he continue to doubt that he and I are alike
cognizant of one and the same real world? If the action is performed
in one world, that must be the world the feeling intends; if in
another world, THAT is the world the feeling has in mind. If your
feeling bear no fruits in my world, I call it utterly detached from
my world; I call it a solipsism, and call its world a dream-world.
If your toothache do not prompt you to ACT as if I had a toothache,
nor even as if I had a separate existence; if you neither say to me,
'I know now how you must suffer!' nor tell me of a remedy, I deny
that your feeling, however it may resemble mine, is really cognizant
of mine. It gives no SIGN of being cognizant, and such a sign is
absolutely necessary to my admission that it is.

Before I can think you to mean my world, you must affect my world;
before I can think you to mean much of it, you must affect much of
it; and before I can be sure you mean it AS I DO, you must affect it
JUST AS I SHOULD if I were in your place. Then I, your critic, will
gladly believe that we are thinking, not only of the same reality,