As to the Allies, I saw no difference of opinion among all those who
came to the head of affairs at this time. Such of the Tories as
were in the system above mentioned, such of them as deserted soon
after from us, and such of the Whigs as had upon this occasion
deserted to us, seemed equally convinced of the unreasonableness,
and even of the impossibility, of continuing the war on the same
disproportionate footing. Their universal sense was, that we had
taken, except the part of the States General, the whole burden of
the war upon us, and even a proportion of this; while the entire
advantage was to accrue to others: that this had appeared very
grossly in 1709, and 1710, when preliminaries were insisted upon,
which contained all that the Allies, giving the greatest loose to
their wishes, could desire, and little or nothing on the behalf of
Great Britain: that the war, which had been begun for the security
of the Allies, was continued for their grandeur: that the ends
proposed, when we engaged in it, might have been answered long
before, and therefore that the first favourable occasion ought to be
seized of making peace; which we thought to be the interest of our
country, and which appeared to all mankind, as well as to us, to be
that of our party.

These were in general the views of the Tories: and for the part I
acted in the prosecution of them, as well as of all the measures
accessory to them, I may appeal to mankind. To those who had the
opportunity of looking behind the curtain I may likewise appeal, for
the difficulties which lay in my way, and for the particular
discouragements which I met with. A principal load of parliamentary
and foreign affairs in their ordinary course lay upon me: the whole
negotiation of the peace, and of the troublesome invidious steps