negotiations; even in matters, such as that of commerce, which they
could not be supposed to understand. That this is a true account of
the means used to arrive at the peace, and a true character of that
Administration in general, I believe the whole Cabinet Council of
that time will bear me witness. Sure I am that most of them have
joined with me in lamenting this state of things whilst it
subsisted, and all those who were employed as Ministers in the
several parts of the treaty felt sufficiently the difficulties which
this strange management often reduced them to. I am confident they
have not forgotten them.

If the means employed to bring the peace about were feeble, and in
one respect contemptible, those employed to break the negotiation
were strong and formidable. As soon as the first suspicion of a
treaty's being on foot crept abroad in the world the whole alliance
united with a powerful party in the nation to obstruct it. From
that hour to the moment the Congress of Utrecht finished, no one
measure possible to be taken was omitted to traverse every advance
that was made in this work, to intimidate, to allure, to embarrass
every person concerned in it. This was done without any regard
either to decency or good policy, and from hence it soon followed
that passion and humour mingled themselves on each side. A great
part of what we did for the peace, and of what others did against
it, can be accounted for on no other principle. The Allies were
broken among themselves before they began to treat with the common
enemy. The matter did not mend in the course of the treaty, and
France and Spain, but especially the former, profited of this
disunion.

Whoever makes the comparison, which I have touched upon, will see