assurances had been given of them. Nothing less. In a matter as
serious as this, all was loose and abandoned to the disposition of
fortune. The first point had never been touched upon; by what I
have said above you see how little care was taken of the second; and
as to the third, the Duke had asked a small body of regular forces,
a sum of money, and a quantity of arms and ammunition. He had been
told in answer by the Court of France that he must absolutely
despair of any number of troops whatever, but he had been made in
general to hope for some money, some arms, and some ammunition; a
little sum had, I think, been advanced to him. In a case so plain
as this it is hard to conceive how any man could err. The
assistances demanded from France at this time, and even greater than
these, will appear, in the sequel of this relation, by the sense of
the whole party, to have been deemed essentially necessary to
success. In such an uncertainty, therefore, whether even these
could be obtained, or rather with so much reason to apprehend that
they could not, it was evident that the Tories ought to have lain
still. They might have helped the ferment against the Government,
but should have avoided with the utmost care the giving any alarm or
even suspicion of their true design, and have resumed or not resumed
it as the Chevalier was able or not able to provide the troops, the
arms, the money, etc. Instead of which those who were at the head
of the undertaking, and therefore answerable for the measures which
were pursued, suffered the business to jog merrily on. They knew in
general how little dependence was to be placed on foreign succour,
but acted as if they had been sure of it; while the party were
rendered sanguine by their passions, and made no doubt of subverting
a Government they were angry with, both one and the other made as
much bustle and gave as great alarm as would have been imprudent
even at the eve of a general insurrection. This appeared to me to