government effectively to suppress the dissemination of
constitutionally unprotected speech, such as obscenity and child
pornography. "The argument . . . that protected speech may be
banned as a means to ban unprotected speech . . . . turns the
First Amendment upside down. The Government may not suppress
lawful speech as the means to suppress unlawful speech."
Ashcroft, 122 S. Ct. at 1404. This rule reflects the judgment
that "[t]he possible harm to society in permitting some
unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the
possibility that protected speech of others may be muted . . . ."
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. at 612.


Thus, in Ashcroft, the Supreme Court rejected the
government's argument that a statute criminalizing the
distribution of constitutionally protected "virtual" child
pornography, produced through computer imaging technology without
the use of real children, was necessary to further the state's
interest in prosecuting the dissemination of constitutionally
unprotected child pornography produced using real children, since
"the possibility of producing images by using computer imaging
makes it very difficult for [the government] to prosecute those
who produce pornography using real children." Ashcroft, 122 S.
Ct. at 1404; see also Stanley, 394 U.S. at 567-58 (holding that
individuals have a First Amendment right to possess obscene
material, even though the existence of this right makes it more
difficult for the states to further their legitimate interest in
prosecuting the distribution of obscenity). By the same token,
even if the use of filters is effective in preventing patrons
from receiving constitutionally unprotected speech, the