that the library plaintiffs must prevail in their contention that
CIPA requires them to violate the First Amendment rights of their
patrons, and accordingly is facially invalid, even under the
standard urged on us by the government, which would permit us to
facially invalidate CIPA only if it is impossible for a single
public library to comply with CIPA's conditions without violating
the First Amendment. In view of the limitations inherent in the
filtering technology mandated by CIPA, any public library that
adheres to CIPA's conditions will necessarily restrict patrons'
access to a substantial amount of protected speech, in violation
of the First Amendment. Given this conclusion, we need not reach
plaintiffs' arguments that CIPA effects a prior restraint on
speech and is unconstitutionally vague. Nor do we decide their
cognate unconstitutional conditions theory, though for reasons
explained infra at note 36, we discuss the issues raised by that
claim at some length.
For these reasons, we will enter an Order declaring Sections
1712(a)(2) and 1721(b) of the Children's Internet Protection
Act, codified at 20 U.S.C. Sec. 9134(f) and 47 U.S.C. Sec.
254(h)(6), respectively, to be facially invalid under the
First Amendment and permanently enjoining the defendants
from enforcing those provisions.II.
Findings of Fact
1. Statutory Framework
1. Nature and Operation of the E-rate and LSTA
Programs
In the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("1996 Act"), Congress
directed the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") to take
the steps necessary to establish a system of support mechanisms
to ensure the delivery of affordable telecommunications service