patrons removing privacy screens, we find, based on the
successful use of privacy screens by the Fort Vancouver Regional
Library and the Multnomah County Public Library, that it is
possible for public libraries to prevent patrons from removing
the screens. Although privacy screens may make it difficult for
patrons to work at the same terminal side by side with other
patrons or with library staff, a library could provide filtered
access at terminals that lack privacy screens, when patrons wish
to use a terminal with others. Alternatively, a library can
reserve terminals outside of patrons' sight lines for groups of
patrons who wish unfiltered access.


We therefore conclude that the government has failed to show
that the less restrictive alternatives discussed above are
ineffective at furthering the government's interest either in
preventing patrons from using library computers to access visual
depictions that are obscene, child pornography, or in the case of
minors, harmful to minors, or in preventing library patrons from
being unwillingly exposed to patently offensive, sexually
explicit speech.
4. Do CIPA's Disabling Provisions Cure the Defect?
The Government argues that even if the use of software
filters mandated by CIPA blocks a substantial amount of speech
whose suppression serves no legitimate state interest, and
therefore fails strict scrutiny's narrow tailoring requirement,
CIPA's disabling provisions cure any lack of narrow tailoring
inherent in filtering technology. The disabling provision
applicable to libraries receiving LSTA grants states that "[a]n
administrator, supervisor, or other authority may disable a