constitutionality of a state law requiring telephone users who
wish to listen to sexually explicit telephone messages to apply
for an access code to receive such messages, and invalidating the
law on the ground that "[a]n identification requirement exerts an
inhibitory effect").
We believe that CIPA's disabling provisions suffer from the
same flaws as the restrictions on speech in Lamont, Denver, and
Fabulous Associates. By requiring library patrons affirmatively
to request permission to access certain speech singled out on the
basis of its content, CIPA will deter patrons from requesting
that a library disable filters to allow the patron to access
speech that is constitutionally protected, yet sensitive in
nature. As we explain above, we find that library patrons will
be reluctant and hence unlikely to ask permission to access, for
example, erroneously blocked Web sites containing information
about sexually transmitted diseases, sexual identity, certain
medical conditions, and a variety of other topics. As discussed
in our findings of fact, software filters block access to a wide
range of constitutionally protected speech, including Web sites
containing information that individuals are likely to wish to
access anonymously.




That library patrons will be deterred from asking permission
to access Web sites containing certain kinds of content is
evident as a matter of common sense as well as amply borne out by
the trial record. Plaintiff Emmalyn Rood, who used the Internet
at a public library to research information relating to her