extent to which the Internet promotes First Amendment values is
evident from the sheer breadth of speech that this new medium
enables.
To survive strict scrutiny, a public library's use of
filtering software must be narrowly tailored to further a
compelling state interest, and there must be no less restrictive
alternative that could effectively further that interest. We
find that, given the crudeness of filtering technology, any
technology protection measure mandated by CIPA will necessarily
block access to a substantial amount of speech whose suppression
serves no legitimate government interest. This lack of narrow
tailoring cannot be cured by CIPA's disabling provisions, because
patrons will often be deterred from asking the library's
permission to access an erroneously blocked Web page, and
anonymous requests for unblocking cannot be acted on without
delaying the patron's access to the blocked Web page, thereby
impermissibly burdening access to speech on the basis of its
content.


Moreover, less restrictive alternatives exist to further a
public library's legitimate interests in preventing its computers
from being used to access obscenity, child pornography, or in the
case of minors, material harmful to minors, and in preventing
patrons from being unwillingly exposed to patently offensive,
sexually explicit speech. Libraries may use a variety of means
to monitor their patrons' use of the Internet and impose
sanctions on patrons who violate the library's Internet use
policy. To protect minors from material harmful to minors,
libraries could grant minors unfiltered access only if