The conception of Justice is thus everywhere interfused with
considerations of utility and expediency.

It will have become plain that if we have in view the justice which is
administered in the courts--we may here term it _Juridical
Justice_--then the question as to whether it is _just_ to refuse the
suffrage to woman will be determined by considering whether the
classification of men as voters and of women as non-voters is in the
public interest. Put otherwise, the question whether it would be just
that woman should have a vote would require the answer "Yes" or "No,"
according as the question whether it would be expedient or inexpedient
that woman should vote required the answer "Yes" or "No." But it would
be for the electorate, not for the woman suffragist, to decide that
question.

There is, as already indicated, another principle which passes under
the name of Justice. I have in view the principle that in the
distribution of wealth or political power, or any other privileges
which it is in the power of the State to bestow, every man should
share equally with every other man, and every woman equally with every
man, and that in countries where Europeans and natives live side by
side, these latter should share all privileges equally with the
white--the goal of endeavour being that all distinctions depending
upon natural endowment, sex, and race should be effaced.

We may call this principle the _Principle of Egalitarian
Equity_--first, because it aims at establishing a quite artificial
equality; secondly, because it makes appeal to our ethical instincts,
and claims on that ground to override the distinctions of which formal
law takes account.