exercised towards those who are linked up to her by a bond of sexual
affection, or a community in blood, or failing this, by a relation of
personal friendship, or by some other personal relation.

And even when altruism has had her perfect work, woman feels no
interest in, and no responsibility towards, any abstract moral ideal.

And though the suffragist may protest, instancing in disproof of this
her own burning enthusiasm for justice, we, for our part, may
legitimately ask whether evidence of a moral enthusiasm for justice
would be furnished by a desire to render to others their due, or by
vehement insistence upon one's own rights, and systematic attempts to
extort, under the cover of the word "justice," advantages for oneself.

But it will be well to dwell a little longer on, and to bring out more
clearly, the point that woman's moral ideals are personal and
domestic, as distinguished from impersonal and public.

Let us note in this connexion that it would be difficult to conceive
of a woman who had become deaf to the appeal of personal and domestic
morality making it a matter of _amour propre_ to respond to a call of
public morality; and difficult to conceive of a woman recovering lost
self-respect by fulfilling such an obligation.

But one knows that woman will rise and respond to the call of any
strong human or transcendental personal affection.

Again, it is only a very exceptional woman who would, when put to her
election between the claims of a narrow and domestic and a wider or
public morality, subordinate the former to the latter.