ally himself with the female legislative reformer.

Passing on to deal with her, it imports us first to realise that while
the male voter has--except where important constitutional issues were
in question--been accustomed to leave actual legislation to the
expert, the female reformer gives notice beforehand that she will, as
soon as ever she gets the suffrage, insist on pressing forward by her
vote her reforming schemes.

What would result from the ordinary voter legislating on matters which
require expert knowledge will be plain to every one who will consider
the evolution of law.

There stand over against each other here, as an example and a warning,
the Roman Law, which was the creation of legal experts: the praetor
and the jurisconsult; and the legal system of the Greeks, which was
the creation of a popular assembly--and it was a popular assembly
which was quite ideally intelligent.

Upon the Roman Law has been built the law of the greater part of the
civilised world. The Greek is a by-word for inconsequence.

How can one, then, without cold shudders think of that legal system
which the female amateur legal reformer would bring to the birth?

Let us consider her qualifications. Let us first take cognisance of
the fact that the reforming woman will neither stand to the principle
that man may, where this gives a balance of advantage, inflict on his
fellow-man, and _a fortiori_ upon animals, death and physical
suffering; nor yet will she stand to the principle that it is