well-understood covenant made in the interest of civilisation, and
that to break through this covenant was to abrogate a humanitarian
arrangement by which the general body of non-combatants immensely
benefits.

Exactly the same principle finds, as already pointed out, application
when a woman employs direct violence, or aspires to exercise by voting
indirect violence.

One always wonders if the suffragist appreciates all that woman stands
to lose and all that she imperils by resort to physical force. One
ought not to have to tell her that, if she had to fight for her
position, her status would be that which is assigned to her among the
Kaffirs--not that which civilised man concedes to her.

>From considering the compromise by which man adapts his dual nature to
violence in the world, we turn to that which the female legislative
reformer would seek to impose by the aid of her vote.

Her proposal, as the reader will have discerned, would be that all
those evils which make appeal to the feminine emotions should be
legally prohibited, and that all those which fail to make this appeal
shall be tolerated.

In the former class would be included those which come directly under
woman's ken, or have been brought vividly before the eyes of her
imagination by emotional description. And the specially intolerable
evils will be those which, owing to the fact that they fall upon woman
or her immediate belongings, induce in the female legislative reformer
pangs of sympathetic discomfort.