and experience of the individual.

This natural presumption of guilt from the mere fact of the
charge is rendered all the more likely by reason of the
uncharitable readiness with which we believe evil of our
fellows. How unctuously we repeat some hearsay bit of
scandal. "I suppose you have heard the report that Deacon
Smith has stolen the church funds?" we say to our friends
with a sententious sigh--the outward sign of an invisible
satisfaction. Deacon Smith after the money-bag? Ha! ha! Of
course, he's guilty! These deacons are always guilty! And in
a few minutes Deacon Smith is ruined forever, although the
fact of the matter may well have been that he was but counting
the money in the collection-plate. This willingness to
believe the worst of others is a matter of common knowledge
and of historical and literary record. "The evil that men do
lives after them--" It might well have been put, "The evil
men are said to have done lives forever." However unfair,
this is a psychologic condition which plays an important part
in rendering the presumption of innocence a gross absurdity.

But let us press the history of Jones and Robinson a step
further. The next event in the latter's criminal history is
his appearance in court before a magistrate. Jones produces
his evidence and calls his witnesses. Robinson, through his
learned counsel, cross-examines them and then summons his own
witnesses to prove his innocence. The proceeding may take
several days or perhaps weeks. Briefs are submitted. The
magistrate considers the testimony and finally decides that he
believes Robinson guilty and must hold him for the action of