prisoner at the dictation of such a boss, who, not content to
issue his commands from behind the arras, came to the
courtroom and ascended the bench to see that they were obeyed.
Usually the jury indignantly resented such interference and
administered a well-merited rebuke by acting directly contrary
to the clearly indicated wishes of the judge.

But while admitting its theoretic value as a bulwark of
liberty, the modern assailant of the jury brushes the
consideration aside by asserting that the system has "broken
down" and "degenerated into a farce."

Let us now see how much of a farce it is. If four times out
of five a judge rendered decisions that met with general
approval, he would probably be accounted a highly satisfactory
judge. Now, out of every one hundred indicted prisoners
brought to the bar for trial, probably fifteen ought to be
acquitted if prosecuted impartially and in accordance with the
strict rules of evidence. In the year 1910 the juries of New
York County convicted in sixty-six per cent of the cases
before them. If we are to test fairly the efficiency of the
system, we must deduct from the thirty-four acquittals
remaining the fifteen acquittals which were justifiable. By
so doing we shall find that in the year 1910 the New York
County juries did the correct thing in about eighty-one cases
out of every hundred. This is a high percentage of
efficiency.* Is it likely that any judge would have done much
better?
_______________________________________