case becomes the subject of an investigation on the part of
his superiors. In fact, the rules of the New York police
department require him to arrest all persons carrying bags in
the small hours who cannot give a satisfactory account of
themselves. Yet there is no such thing under the laws of the
State as a right "to arrest on suspicion." No citizen may be
arrested under the statutes unless a crime has actually been
committed. Thus, the police regulations deliberately compel
every officer either to violate the law or to be made the
subject of charges for dereliction of duty. A confusing state
of things, truly, to a man who wants to do his duty by himself
and by his fellow-citizens!

The present author once wrote a book dealing with the
practical administration of criminal justice, in which the
unlawfulness of arrest on mere "suspicion" was discussed at
length and given a prominent place. But when the time came
for publication that portion of it was omitted at the earnest
solicitation of certain of the authorities on the ground that
as such arrests were absolutely necessary for the enforcement
of the criminal law a public exposition of their illegality
would do infinite harm. Now, as it seems, the time has come
when the facts, for one reason or another, should be faced.
The difficulty does not end, however, with "arrest on
suspicion," "the third degree," "mugging," or their allied
abuses. It really goes to the root of our whole theory of the
administration of the criminal law. Is it possible that on
final analysis we may find that our enthusiastic insistence
upon certain of the supposedly fundamental liberties of the
individual has led us into a condition of legal hypocrisy